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"In Good Hands"* or "Bad Faith"? An
Insurer's Failure to Waive Subrogation
Rights in Pennsylvania Underinsured
Motorist Cases
I. Introduction
On February 12, 1984, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law,' designed to strike a
balance between optimum accident victim protection and cost effi-
ciency.2 The new law addresses the problem of unrecoverable auto-
mobile accident claims and inadequate insurance coverage 3 by re-
quiring that every motor vehicle liability insurance policy contain
both uninsured4  and underinsured 5 motorist coverage in amounts
* The phrase "in good hands" is used strictly in the generic sense and not as a
representative slogan of a particular insurance company.
I. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1798 (Purdon 1984). For a concise outline of the
principal features of the new law, see Ronca, New Insurance Law Effective Oct. 1, PA. L.J.
REP., Feb. 20, 1984, I.
2. See generally, Mundy, Introduction to the Legislative History, Intent, and Purpose
of the New Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, THE NEW PA. AUTO INSURANCE ACT
(1984) (available from PA Trial Lawyers Ass'n).
3. This was not the first time the Pennsylvania legislature had addressed the problem of
unrecoverable automobile accident claims. Pennsylvania enacted its first uninsured motorist
statute in 1963, Act of Aug. 14, 1963, Act No. 433, § I, 1963 PA. LAWS 909, and subse-
quently broadened the coverage in 1968. Act of Dec. 19, 1968, Act No. 397, § I(b), 1968 PA.
LAWS 1254 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 2000 (Purdon 1971)).
4. An "uninsured motor vehicle" is defined as any of the following:
(I) A motor vehicle for which there is no liability insurance or self-insur-
ance applicable at the time of the accident.
(2) A motor vehicle for which the insurance company denies coverage or
the insurance company is or becomes involved in insolvency proceedings in any
jurisdiction.
(3) An unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in injury
provided the accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority
and the claimant notifies his insurer within 30 days, or as soon as practicable
thereafter, that the claimant or his legal representative has a legal action arising
out of the accident.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Purdon 1984).
5. An "underinsured motor vehicle" is defined as "a motor vehicle for which the limits
of available liability insurance and self-insurance are insufficient to pay losses and damages."
Id. In several jurisdictions, courts have extended the definition of "uninsured motorist" to in-
clude situations in which the insured party's recovery is less than the minimum coverage re-
quired by statute. See, e.g., Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 475
P.2d 258, modified on other grounds, 106 Ariz. 345, 476 P.2d 155 (1970) (tortfeasor consid-
ered uninsured to extent the statutory minimum exceeded amount recovered). Other courts
have recognized the "oft-cited anomaly that those in the position of these claimants would find
themselves in a better position were the tortfeasor's vehicle totally uninsured rather than un-
derinsured," Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77 N.J. 563, 572, 391 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1978) (leg-
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equal to the amount of liability coverage purchased.6 This provision
islative intent was to protect public from uninsured, not underinsured motorists), but have
failed to rectify the inequity through the judicial system. Twenty-six states, have codified pro-
visions for underinsured motorist coverage in one form or another. ARIz. REV. STATE ANN. §
20-259.01 (1983 Cum. Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-175 (West 1983 Cum. Supp.);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11 (1984 Supp.); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West 1983 Cum.
Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-320 (Baldwin 1982 Cum. Supp.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22.1406 (West 1983 Cum. Supp.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2902 (1983 Cum.
Supp.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541 (1983 Cum. Supp.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §
113L (Law Co-op. 1984 Cum. Supp.); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101 (1983 Cum. Supp.);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (1983 Supp.); N.Y. INS. LAW § 167 (McKinney 1983 Cum.
Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Anderson
1983 CuM. Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636 (West 1983 Cum. Supp.); 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1731 (Purdon 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-1201 (Law Co-op. 1983 Cum.
Supp.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9.4 (1983 Cum. Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-
1201 (1983 Cum. Supp.); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 5.06-1 (Vernon 1983 Cum. Supp.);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 941 (1983 CuM. Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (1983 Cum.
Supp.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48-22.030 (1984 Cum. Supp.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-
31 (1983 Cum. Supp.).
6. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731(a) (Purdon 1984). The statute expressly provides in
pertinent part:
SUBCHAPTER C. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE
§ 1731. Scope and amount of coverage
(a) General rule. - No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this Commonwealth, with respect to any motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged in this Commonwealth, unless unin-
sured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages are provided therein or sup-
plemental thereto in amounts equal to the bodily injury liability coverage except
as provided in section 1734 (relating to request for lower or higher limits of
coverage).
(b) Uninsured motorist coverage. - Uninsured motorist coverage shall pro-
vide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage. - Underinsured motorist coverage
shall provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the mainte-
nance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages
therefor from owners or operators of underinsured vehicles.
(d) Limitation on recovery. - A person who recovers damages under unin-
sured motorist coverage or coverages cannot recover damages under underin-
sured motorist coverage or coverages for the same accident.
§ 1732. Limits of coverage
Coverages offered under section 1731 (relating to scope and amount of cov-
erage) shall be written for the same limits. No change shall be made in the
limits of one of these coverages without an equal change in the limits of the
other coverage.
§ 1733. Priority of recovery
Where multiple policies apply, payment shall be made in the following or-
der of priority:
( I ) A policy covering a motor vehicle occupied by the injured person
at the time of the accident.
(2) A policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the accident
with respect to which the injured person is insured.
§ 1734. Request for lower or higher limits of coverage
A named insured may request in writing the issuance of coverages under
section 1731 (relating to scope and amount of coverage) in amounts less than the
SUBROGATION RIGHTS
transfers determination of the amount of available coverage from the
tortfeasor to the victim and removes the inequity of having the in-
sured's limit of recovery hinge upon circumstances beyond his
control.
7
While uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsements pro-
vide significant protection for covered Pennsylvania drivers, the spe-
cial nature of the insurance relationship lends itself to abuses which
directly contradict the stated purpose of the new law: victim-oriented
protection.' The insurer's interests become somewhat "aligned" with
those of the negligent tortfeasor because uninsured and underinsured
motorist policies are essentially a type of first-party coverage.10 This
limits of liability for bodily injury but in no event less than the amounts required
by the chapter for bodily injury. If the named insured has selected uninsured
and underinsured motorist coverage in connection with a policy previously issued
to him by the same insurer under section 1731, the coverages offered need not be
provided in excess of the limits of liability previously issued for uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage unless the named insured requests in writing
higher limits of liability for those coverages.
§ 1735. Coverages unaffected by workers' compensation benefits
The coverages required by this subchapter shall not be made subject to an
exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits
payable as a result of the same injury.
§ 1736. Coverages in excess of required amounts
The coverages provided under this subchapter may be offered by insurers in
amounts higher than those required by this chapter but may not be greater than
the limits of liability specified in the bodily injury liability provisions of the in-
sured's policy.
Id. at §§ 1731-1736 (footnotes and citations omitted).
7. One commentator described the unfortunate situation as follows: "Frequently, a trial
court would award damages to an injured party only to find that the negligent party could not
meet the financial burden of the judgment. Thus, the injured party received little or no com-
pensation." Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage Laws: The Problem of the Uninsured Motor-
ist, 55 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 541, 541 (1980).
8. The term "adhesion contract" was used to describe the insurance relationship as early
as 1919. "The [insurance] contract is drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely
'adheres' to it, has little choice as to its terms." Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919). Former California Supreme Court Justice Mat-
thew Tobriner elaborated on the concept many years later, stating:
The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it
.... Such an agreement does not issue from that freedom in bargaining and
equality of bargaining which are the theoretical parents of the American law of
contracts. Yet, today, the impact of these standardized contracts can hardly be
exaggerated ... [T]he party of superior bargaining power not only prescribes
the words of the instrument but the party who subscribes to it lacks the eco-
nomic strength to change such language. Hence any ambiguity in the contract
should be resolved against the draftsman, and questions of doubtful interpreta-
tion should be construed in favor of the subscribing party.
Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App.2d 690, 694-5, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (1961)
(citations omitted). See infra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
9. Mundy, supra note 2, at 4.
10. Under first-party insurance, "the insured makes a direct claim against his or her
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causes a potential for disputes between the insurer and its insured
and often lends the relationship an adversarial nature." Recognizing
this predisposition, courts in several jurisdictions have imposed liabil-
ity on insurers for breach of their duty of good faith and fair dealing
to their insureds 2 in an effort to equalize the parties' bargaining
power and to "police" the contracts.1
After presenting the evolution of uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage in the United States"' and Pennsylvania, 5 this
Comment explores the potential for abuse by insurers,16 and the ap-
plicability of tort law and other principles to situations involving an
insurer's bad faith refusal to waive its subrogation rights to a vic-
tim's third party recovery.17 The focus then turns to the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of imposing liability for breach of an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing in the area of subroga-
tion.'8 Finally, this Comment attempts to determine the effect such
an action will have on the so-called "insurance crisis"' 9 and the
problem of the financially irresponsible motorist."0
insurer when the covered contingency, an injury caused by an uninsured or underinsured mo-
torist, occurs." W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE, & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION §
4.01 (1984) [hereinafter W. SHERNOFF]. Shernoff offers a discussion of the similarities of un-
insured and underinsured motorist coverage to third-party liability coverage.
I. Id. This alignment of interests is ironic, as insurers present themselves to the public
as "underwriters of risks for the benefit of their insureds." E. PATTERSON. ESSENTIALS OF IN-
SURANCE LAW § 1, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1957).
12. See infra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
13. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 1.03.
14. See infra notes 21-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 148-82 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text, Section V.
19. The insurance crisis has been defined in terms of judgment predictability:
[T]he condition of predictability is . . . essential for a system of private
insurance . . . . When insurance is sold under competitive conditions to individ-
ual risks, the losses of each risk . . . must be predictable in order to determine
an appropriate premium charge. When losses . . . become unpredictable
an insurance crisis usually follows.
Schmalz, Superfunds and Tort Law Reform - Are They Insurable?, 38 Bus. LAW. 175, 178
(1982-1983). Other entities, such as the Independent Insurance Agents of Pennsylvania, couch
the problem in very different terms: "[N]o issue is more fundamental to the current insurance
crisis than the explosion, in this country, of litigation, court decree, liability assessment, jury
awards, and settlement costs currently associated with our tort system." INSURANCE COMMIT-
TEE OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 170TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, 1986 SESs., RE-
PORT ON LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS IN PENNSYLVANIA at 11-14 (1986). Finally, others con-
tend that the "crisis" is, in fact, nothing more than an aberration. See infra, text, Section V.
20. See infra, text, Section VI.
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II. The Development of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist
Coverage
A. The United States
The advent of the automobile in America brought with it a
myriad of social and economic changes. As society became increas-
ingly mobile, the country experienced an accompanying rise in the
number of accident-related personal injuries and deaths.2 1 Negligent
motorists, however, were frequently unable to bear the financial bur-
den of plaintiff reparation, and innocent victims often remained un-
dercompensated for their losses.2 Several innovative remuneration
schemes evolved as a means of indemnifying non-negligent victims
regardless of the tortfeasor's ability to pay.2 Most of these early
compensation plans addressed three basic inequities in the current
state of affairs: victim undercompensation, legal impediments to re-
covery, and the lack of successful deterrents to the financially irre-
sponsible motorist.
2'
The most serious and obvious result of America's newfound mo-
bility was the undercompensated victim.2 5 Financially irresponsible
21. A. WIDISS, J. LITTLE. R. CLARK, & T. JONES, No FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN
ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MASSACHUSETTS, FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND MICHIGAN 15
(1977) [hereinafter A. WIDISS]. One essayist of the early 1900s envisioned a situation in which
the increasing number of automobiles, "constantly whizzing through villages, towns, cities,
counties, and across the states are bound to call forth from the courts judicial utterances pecu-
liar to the automobile's status." Huddy, The Law of Automobiles, 9 LAW NOTES 147 (1905).
This proved to be true as "the cost of being a nation on wheels was an ever increasing toll of
persons killed and injured in automobile accidents . . . . In December, 1951, our millionth
traffic death occurred - more than all of the dead in all of our wars combined." James &
Law, Compensation for Automobile Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late,
26 CONN. B.J. 70 (1952).
22. See generally Note, supra note 7. When the automobile was first introduced into
American society, it was a luxury only the very wealthy could afford. Shortly thereafter assem-
bly-line production made cars affordable for even the average factory worker, and ownership
increased dramatically. This likewise multiplied the chance that a motorist would be unable to
pay for any resulting injury or damage. 2 NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMO-
BILE INSURANCE § 22.00 (B. Denkensohn ed. 1986).
23. P. PRETZEL. UNINSURED MOTORISTS I (1972). Between 1925 and 1960, most of the
state-enacted automobile insurance legislation was aimed at "inducing motorists to acquire
some minimum amount of liability insurance." A. WIDISS, supra note 21, at 16. Massachusetts
made possession of automobile insurance compulsory in 1927. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90 § IA
(Law Co-op. 1975). New York followed in 1956, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 312 (McKinney
1960), and North Carolina in 1957. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 through 20-319 (1957 Supp.).
See also infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
24. See generally 2 NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE,
supra note 22, at § 22.10.
25. One author depicted the problem in terms of human costs:
A study of closed cases only, that is, cases exclusive of those where the
matter was still pending or some hope of compensation still lingered, showed
that more than half of the fatal and permanent injuries either had received noth-
ing and expected to receive nothing or had received less than the actual expense
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drivers were causing injuries and deaths for which there was little or
no remuneration, and long-accepted doctrines of accountability be-
came increasingly inadequate to handle the dilemma. Under tradi-
tional concepts of fault, the tortfeasor was responsible for compen-
sating the injured person for his damages. The new scenario
presented a problem in which the liable party could not pay and the
victim was powerless to protect himself."
Even in situations where a tortfeasor was not judgment-proof, a
non-negligent victim often faced significant and insurmountable legal
hurdles to recovery. The burden of proof typically fell on the inno-
cent driver, who was forced to show not only the tortfeasor's blame-
worthiness but also his own freedom from guilt."7 These strict fault
requirements were intensified by the problems of a clogged court sys-
tem and prohibitive litigation expenses. Often the prospect of lengthy
delays and protracted legal proceedings influenced a plaintiff's deci-
sion to settle, many times for an amount significantly less than the
real value of the claim. The system was particularly harsh for low
and middle income victims who literally could not afford to wait
of the accident. This proportion was probably lower than the average since the
figures were based on a series of studies which included two studies in Massa-
chusetts, where insurance is compulsory.
But our concern is not so much with who gives compensation as with the
extent of compensation received. If we lump all forms of compensation, whether
from insurance, liable party, employer, etc., we have the following:
BALANCE OF COMPENSATION WITH ACCIDENT EXPENSES
RECEIVED
All injuries Temporary Permanent
N othing ............................ 41.6* 43.2 48.3
Less than medical expense ............ 6.7 5.5 11.0
Medical expense equivalent ............ 6.6 7.5 1.7
More than medical expense,
less than total ..................... 11.2 11.9 11.0
Total expense or more ................ 33.9 32.6 28.0
*14% of these might in the future receive something. They were not closed.
In short, 67% of the temporary injuries and 72% of the permanent injuries
had received less than the actual expenses of the accident. Of all cases, tempo-
rary, permanent and fatal injuries, 66% received less than the equivalent of ac-
tual expenses.
Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences, 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
466, 470 (footnotes omitted).
26. 2 NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22,
at § 22.10(l)(a).
27. An opinion illustrative of this early principal is Wheeler v. Wall, 157 Mo. App. 38,
137 S.W. 63 (1911) (plaintiff precluded from recovery when his own negligence contributed to
injury). See also Richard M. Nixon's essay on the erosion of fault in automobile accident
cases. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936).
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months or even years for determinations in their favor. 8
Perhaps the most frustrating problem addressed by early insur-
ance reformers was the need for an effective deterrent for financially
irresponsible motorists. Until this time, no substantial penalties were
imposed on negligent and insolvent drivers. A tortfeasor was not sub-
jected to a license restriction, and he was not required to refrain
from driving. 9 In addition, some scholars thought liability insurance
was an evil in itself which actually reduced the effect of a tort judg-
ment and compounded the problem faced by society by "alleviating
the punitive consequences of misconduct."3 Thus, the situation fac-
ing reformers demanded complex yet workable solutions.
1. Early Compensation Schemes.-The problems faced by
early insurance reformers resulted in several progressive remunera-
tion systems. Financial responsibility laws, compulsory insurance,
and unsatisfied judgment funds were the most prevalent. 1
Financial responsibility laws first appeared in 1925 when the
Connecticut legislature enacted a law requiring a limited class of
motorists to demonstrate proof of their ability to respond in damages
28. 2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22,
at § 22.10(l)(b). One compensation scheme avoided the problem of congested courts by
sharply limiting an accident victim's access to litigation for indemnification of damages. Under
the "Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan," a plaintiff's right to sue attached only in the
event his or her damages exceeded certain arbitrary minimum amounts. R. KEETON & J.
O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 299-399 (1965) [hereinafter KEETON & O'CONNELL].
29. 2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22,
at § 22.10(l)(c).
30. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 28, at 252. The authors questioned whether the
principle of deterrence could be applicable to automobile accident situations:
[D]eterrence connotes the operation of conscious free choice to fulfill or to
disregard the standards of conduct by which one is judged. Whether this conno-
tation realistically applies in automobile cases can be questioned, since tort lia-
bility insurance has diluted further the element of blameworthiness in negligence
standards. Courts and juries would less often be willing to make the findings of
negligence required for liability if individual defendants, rather than insurers,
were expected to pay the judgments. In practice the burden falls on the latter,
and, as a result, a supercritical standard is frequently applied to a driver's con-
duct in order to characterize it as negligent and thus allow the victim to reach
the insurance proceeds. Increasingly, morally blameless conduct is so character-
ized. What is "punished" by an adverse verdict is not so much fault as mis-
chance. Punishment, on these terms, does not deter dangerous driving. The
driver whose conduct has been subjected to a supercritical standard and found
wanting tends to think of himself not as properly chastised but only as somehow
victimized or unlucky. Thus, tort liability insurance has had little net effect on
deterrence of dangerous driving, but it has had great impact on the role of fault
in automobile cases.
id. at 253.
31. M. WOODROOF. J. FONSECA. & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-
FAULT LAW § 7:1 (1974) [hereinafter M. WOODROOF].
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for any future accidents they might cause. 2 The group included,
among others, persons held responsible for accidents resulting in in-
jury, death, or qualifying property damage, and those convicted of
reckless driving.83  Similar "future proof' 3 4 laws were enacted by
Vermont, 5 Maine," Rhode Island,37 and Minnesota,3" but the acts
were likened to "locking the stable door after the horse is stolen" 39
since a tortfeasor's first victim often went uncompensated.
Early financial responsibility acts had other problems as well.
Relatively few motorists fell within the class of persons covered by
the laws,' 0 and among those affected, compliance was a problem."
Furthermore, administration was complicated and difficult.'2 Critics
32. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 183.
33. Braun, The Financial Responsibility Law, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505, 507
(1936). Persons convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated or of evasion of re-
sponsibility were also required to prove financial responsibility. Id.
34. One author described the future proof laws and their objectives in the following
manner:
Upon causing injury or being convicted of a serious driving violation, the
law required that the driver, and frequently the owner, prove that he would be
able to pay damages for any future accidents that he might cause. The objective
of the future proof laws was to prevent accidents by removing the poor driver
from the road. If that driver could not be removed, he at least would carry insur-
ance, the cost of which would be higher to reflect the greater risk associated with
his poor driving record. Alternatively, the driver could post a bond.
2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22, at
22.20(1)(b).
35. 1927 Vt. Laws 81 (approved March 26, 1927, and effective June I, 1927).
36. 1927 Me. Acts 210 (approved April 15, 1927, and effective January I, 1928).
37. 1927 R.I. Pub. Laws 1040 (approved April 22, 1927, and effective June 21, 1927).
38. 1927 Minn. Laws 412 (approved and effective April 23, 1927).
39. Comment, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: The Problem and Its Solution,
32 COLUM. L. REV. 785, 796 (1932).
40. Evidence of this can be found in state statistics. "For example, in the State of New
York in 1941, only 26 persons for every 10,000 cars registered were required to file proof."
Braun, The Need for Revision of Financial Responsibility Legislation, 40 Nw. UL. REV. 237,
240 (1945) (footnotes omitted).
41. N.P. Feinsinger compiled an extensive set of data on citizen noncompliance with
financial responsibility laws:
In Vermont, for instance, from 1927 through 1935, 15,381 persons were
required to file. The record shows 8,724 filed and 5,603 did not file, leaving a
difference of 958 unaccounted for. Some of these were relieved from the require-
ment, but apparently others were lost in the shuffle, perhaps unlocated. In Cali-
fornia from 1931 to 1935 inclusive, proof was filed in 839, or less than 25 per
cent, of the 3,432 cases of filed judgments. The percentage has been increasing
gradually, however. In 1935 it exceeded 45 per cent. In Connecticut from 1926
to 1935 inclusive, proof has been required in 101,055 cases, and furnished in
58,124 or 57 per cent of the cases. The compliance figures during that period, in
percentages, are as follows: 46, 52, 65, 58, 56, 66, 74, 56, 38, and 36. These
figures indicate a growing disregard for the new law since 1932.
Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 519,
526-27 (1936).
42. See generally Stoeckle, Administrative Problems of Financial Responsibility Laws,
3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 531 (1936).
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quickly realized that the main objectives of the laws - compelling
the known bad driver to insure and increasing the proportion of in-
sured cars or drivers' - remained miserably unmet in actual
practice."
New Hampshire pioneered a different type of financial responsi-
bility legislation in 1937 with its enactment of a "security deposit
law.' 45 The new genre of accident remuneration required a defend-
ant motorist to deposit security for any judgment which might arise
out of the driver's first accident. Ownership of a currently valid lia-
bility policy would satisfy the deposit condition. Unlike the "safety
measure" orientation of future proof laws,'" security responsibility
measures placed a much greater emphasis on protection of the acci-
dent victim,47 and the innovation was hailed as the solution to the
43. Feinsinger, supra note 41, at 522. Other objectives included segregating the bad
driver, preventing or decreasing automobile accidents, and procuring payment of past damage.
Id.
44. The 1932 Columbia Report, REPORT BY COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
1932) [hereinafter Columbia Report], bluntly concluded that the early compensation schemes
not only failed to provide proper remuneration for accident victims but also produced periph-
eral results which were socially undesirable. Comment, supra note 39, at 786. One commenta-
tor summarized the report, which elaborated upon the weaknesses of the legislation:
[The Columbia Committee] found that, even assuming a habitually careless
class of drivers to exist, financial responsibility laws as then constituted were not
effective in segregating it; there was no evidence that such legislation did operate
to compel careless drivers to insure, nor did it cause any general voluntary in-
crease in the carrying of liability insurance. Where motorists actually came
under compulsion of the law, administrative weaknesses in the legislation would
frequently render it ineffective, for many such drivers would fail to surrender
registration plates and license cards, or would continue to operate vehicles in
violation of the law. This situation was found particularly acute where the driver
was not the owner, and hence could not be compelled to insure the vehicle. Fur-
thermore, since a motorist who had an accident could always elect to leave the
highway, financial responsibility carried no guarantee that a victim would re-
cover a judgment or that such a judgment would be satisfied. The "first" acci-
dent victim was left especially unprotected. Finally, the Committee found that
one of the main purposes of the law was completely unfulfilled, for there was no
evidence of a decrease in the number of accidents or of any relationship whatso-
ever between the number of accidents and the number of license revocations or
suspensions.
Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300,
306 (1950).
45. 1942 N.H. Laws 122. By 1950, 23 states had similar enactments: California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For a complete list of citations see
Grad, supra note 44, at 307 n.24.
46. Grad, supra note 44, at 308.
47. For example:
By forcing a deposit of security for the first accident, some pressure is
brought on the motorist to render himself financially responsible before he is
involved in that "first" accident, for no adverse judgment is now necessary to
deprive him of road privileges. By imposing the requirement of a security de-
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problem of the financially irresponsible motorist."' The optimism was
short-lived, however, as critics quickly realized that, in practice, se-
curity deposit laws really afforded no greater protection for a motor-
ist's first accident victim.
4 9
Compulsory insurance laws emerged in the United States at
about the same time financial responsibility statutes were enacted in
several areas. Many of the original acts were designed to cover com-
mercial vehicles, 50 but Massachusetts extended its compulsory insur-
ance legislation to passenger vehicles in 1927.51 As one author ex-
plained, "[t]he compulsory policy did not provide any protection for
the victim who was unable to establish the legal liability of the in-
sured. It was not a system to assure compensation to all injured per-
sons, but rather was a system designed to ensure the existence of
solvent defendants."5 Most legislation effected this end by requiring
an automobile owner to have liability insurance as a condition of
receiving motor vehicle registration."3
Compulsory insurance laws greatly reduce many of the
problems commonly associated with financial responsibility laws,
such as the often-uncompensated "first" victim."' These plans have
been criticized, however, for causing increased insurance premiums
in urban areas and for causing substantial losses for carriers.5 In
addition, compulsory insurance legislation has resulted in an increase
in the number of court cases in an already-overburdened judicial sys-
tem.58 However, "the prediction that compulsory insurance would re-
posit-a requirement by far more difficult to fulfill than that of financial respon-
sibility-upon any driver merely involved in an accident, the law peripherally
adopts a standard of liability regardless of fault.
Id. at 308-9.
48. The security deposit system has been described as one in which the defendant motor-
ist no longer "got all the breaks." Wagner, Safety Responsibility Laws - A Review of Recent
Developments, 9 GA. B.J. 160, 166 (1946).
49. Grad, supra note 44, at 310-11.
50. See generally Brownfield, Compulsory Liability Insurance for Commercial Motor
Vehicles, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 571 (1936).
51. See supra note 23. The 1925 Connecticut plan, supra note 32, actually was a com-
promise between the strict requirements of compulsory insurance and the more flexible princi-
ples of financial responsibility laws.
52. 2 NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22,
at § 22.20(l)(b). In this sense, compulsory insurance differs from a no-fault plan, which pro-
vides compensation on a first-party basis.
53. Id. at § 22.20(2). For a discussion of the various state compulsory automobile insur-
ance provisions existing in 1930, see Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insur-
ance, 16 A.B.A. J. 362 (1930).
54. According to the Columbia Report, supra note 44, compulsory insurance affords
greater victim protection and loss coverage than financial responsibility laws. Id. at 115-16,
129 n.17, 209.
55. Id. at 116-25. See also Grad, supra note 44, at 313-16.
56. Massachusetts statistics are representative of the effects felt in other states:
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suit in more careless driving because the driver would have nothing
to lose does not appear to have come true. ' ' 7
Another innovative accident reparation system developed in the
late 1940s. The unsatisfied judgment fund (also called an unsatisfied
claim fund) was premised on the idea that it is a state government's
duty to protect its citizen motorists from uninsured drivers." In most
"fund" states,69 an injured motorist is first required to reduce his
claim to judgment and determine that it is uncollectible6 0 The vic-
tim then receives compensation from the fund,6' which, in a sense,
becomes the insurer. By the early 1970s, only five states had created
unsatisfied claim funds,62 but a few insurance companies had added
a comparable provision to their basic automobile insurance policies.
63
These endorsements were the predecessors of uninsured motorist
coverage.
2. "Filling the Gap" - The Evolution of Uninsured Motorist
Coverage.-Despite the efforts of insurance reformers and the early
compensation plans, the insurance situation following World War II
The compulsory motor vehicle insurance act took effect on January 1, 1927.
Its results clearly appear in the number of entries for the court year beginning
July I, 1927, and ending June 20, 1928, which show an increase of over 9,000
entries above those for the year ending on June 30, 1926, the last full court year
prior to the effective date of the act. While it cannot be positively asserted that
the increase in entries was composed solely of motor tort cases, there being no
separate statistics on that point, nevertheless, it seems obvious that such was the
fact. The Massachusetts Judicial Council stated in its 1929 report that for the
five months' period from October I, 1927, to March I, 1928, there were 4,201
more law cases entered in the superior court than in the same period October
1926 to March 1927, and that of this increase 97.4 per cent were motor vehicle
cases.
Carpenter, Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance and Court Congestion in Massachusetts, 3
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 554, 556-57 (1936).
57. 2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 22, at §
22.20(2)(b).
58. P. PRETZEL, supra note 23, at 163.
59. The fund states are Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York and North Da-
kota. New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC), 1969 N.Y.
Ins. Laws, Art. 17-A, 600, which incorporates both uninsured motorist and "fund" principles,
is perhaps the most well known unsatisfied judgment system. For an in-depth discussion of
MVAIC, see Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Presently
Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFF, L. REv. 283, 290-96
(1960).
60. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 4.02(l).
61. The funds often are raised from motor vehicle registration fees, gasoline taxes, or
other sources which "tend to spread the risk of loss over the entire motoring public." P. PRET-
ZEL, supra note 23, at 163. New Jersey requires each uninsured auto registrant to pay $3,
each insured registrant $1, and insurance companies one-half of one percent of net direct in-
surance premiums. 1952 N.J. Laws 195.
62. See supra note 59.
63. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 4.02(I).
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looked dismal. The number of automobiles on America's highways
increased dramatically 64 and the incidence of injury-causing acci-
dents rose accordingly.6 5 Although forty-nine states had adopted
some type of financial responsibility legislation by 1960,"s many in-
nocent victims of uninsured motorists were left uncompensated for
their injuries.67 The benefits of society's greater mobility were
tainted with the blood of drivers killed and injured on the country's
roadways.
The insurance industry was "caught in the middle" of the situa-
tion: bound by state legislation yet adamantly opposed to any form
of compulsory insurance.68 In an effort to avoid a reparation system
in which juries resolve questions of liability and damages, insurance
companies offered to design a privately-operated compensation pro-
posal.69 In 1956, one year after New York offered the country's first
uninsured motorist coverage,7 0 the National Bureau of Casualty Un-
derwriters and the Mutual Rating Bureau made a similar endorse-
ment available to the family policyholder.7 1 By 1978, forty-eight
states had adopted some form of uninsured motorist legislation, eigh-
teen of which required the coverage to be mandatory.7
The standard uninsured motorist (UM) endorsement adopted
by a majority of states provided that an insured agree:
to pay all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of such uninsured automobile; provided determina-
tion as to whether the insured is legally entitled to recover such
damages, and if so, the amount thereof, shall be made by agree-
ment between the insured and the company or, if they fail to
64. Between 1925 and 1959, the number of automobiles travelling the nation's highways
quadrupled, and their speed more than doubled. Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 154, 155 (1959).
65. Note, supra note 7, at 541.
66. Loiseaux, supra note 64, at 157.
67. Note, supra note 7, at 541.
68. Piehler, Uninsured Motorist Claims, II AM. JUR. TRIALS 73, 77-78 (1966).
69. Id. at 78.
70. P. PRETZEL, supra note 23, at 4.
71. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 4.02(l).
72. Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin required mandatory acceptance. 2 I.
SCHERMER. AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE: NO-FAULT INSURANCE, UNINSURED MOTOR-
ISTS COMPULSORY COVERAGE § 23.01 (1985).
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agree, by arbitration. 3
This provision differs from a typical liability insurance policy be-
cause payment is made on a first-party basis. Therefore, an insurer
pays damages to its own insured.74 Requirements differed from state
to state 75 but most policies provided UM coverage in amounts up to
the limits of the available liability coveragee.7  Generally, such cover-
age included personal injury but not property damage." Thus, an
insured could generally recover damages for medical expenses, lost
wages, and pain and suffering."' Uninsured motorist provisions es-
sentially "filled the gap left by liability insurance. ' 7 9
3. The Need for a Further Solution: Underinsured Motorist
Coverage.-Uninsured motorist coverage was welcomed by the driv-
ing public"0 and widely accepted by a vast majority of states,8' yet
the plans failed to reconcile the situation of a tortfeasor with inade-
quate insurance coverage. As private ownership of motor vehicles in-
creased,82 rapidly rising medical expenses and the ravages of infla-
tion greatly added to the cost of accidents. 3 Increasingly, victims
received compensation in amounts less than the statutory minimum
coverage requirements.8" This resulted in a rather anomalous and in-
73. Id. at 7. Pretzel points out a common misconception about UM endorsements: "That
uninsured motorist coverage is not a form of 'no-fault' insurance cannot be overemphasized.
The insurer who is himself at fault and who therefore would be denied recovery against the
uninsured motorist cannot recover under the UM provisions of his own policy." P. PRETZEL,
supra note 23, at 5.
74. See supra note 10. Under third-party coverage, on the other hand, the insured
"seeks indemnity from his or her insurer for a claim by a third party or outside claimant." W.
SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 3.01.
75. For example, some states retain the fault principle, requiring proof of an uninsured
motorist's liability to the insured in order for coverage to accrue. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §
11580.2(a)(I) (West 1972). This standard is followed by a majority of the states which offer
UM coverage. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1(1) (Vernon 1981), FLA. STAT. §
627.727(l) (1984). An alternative scheme assumes that the uninsured tortfeasor is liable for
the resulting damages.
76. The rationale behind this circumscription is that "limits which the insured judged
adequate for the protection of others was generally considered reasonable for his own protec-
tion." 3 NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 30.10(l) (B. Denkensohn ed.
1986).
77. Piehler, supra note 68, at § 7.
78. See, e.g., Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 238 Cal. App.2d 64, 67, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 467, 469 (1965). But see FLA. STAT. §§ 627.727(7), 627.737(2) (limiting recovery of
pain and suffering in uninsured motorist cases).
79. 3 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 76,
at § 30.00.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 64.
83. 3 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, supra note 76, at 30.00.
84. Undercompensation resulted from a number of situations, as explained by the
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equitable situation: victims injured by totally uninsured motorists
were being compensated to a greater extent than those persons
harmed by drivers with limited but insufficient amounts of liability
insurance.8 The problem of the underinsured motorist rapidly quali-
fied the success of the early UM endorsements.
A few courts attempted to remedy the situation by allowing vic-
tim compensation under a UM endorsement when the injured party's
recovery was less than the minimum coverage required by statute. 6
In this way, the definition of an uninsured motorist was extended to
include an underinsured driver and recovery was broadened to en-
sure that victims were more fully compensated. The remedy was lim-
ited, however, as the majority of jurisdictions failed to adopt such a
policy.8
7
Gradually, state legislatures began to adopt measures address-
ing the problem of the underinsured motorist, and by the mid-1980s
over half had enacted some form of regulation.88 Two major types of
measures emerged. "Excess" insurance provided remuneration by
adding the underinsurance to the tortfeasor's coverage. 9 "Gap" in-
following:
The term "underinsured" has varying interpretations depending upon the
context in which it is used. First, it may refer to a motorist who, although in-
sured, does not maintain liability insurance in at least the minimum amounts
required by the state wherein the accident has occurred. Second, it may refer to
a motorist who maintains liability insurance in the minimum amount required
by statute, of which the innocent party receives nothing or less than the statu-
tory minimum. This situation occurs when several persons are injured in an acci-
dent and the tortfeasor's insurance company settles with all or some of them,
often exhausting the tortfeasor's coverage before all injured parties are fully in-
demnified for losses. Finally, certain states have recently amended their unin-
sured motorist statutes to provide such coverage when the liability insurance of
the tortfeasor is less than the uninsured motorist coverage provided under the
injured party's policy.
Comment, When Enough Isn't Enough: Supplementing Uninsured Motorist Coverage in
Pennsylvania, 54 TEMPLE L.Q. 281, 298 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
85. See supra note 5; see also infra note 156 and accompanying text.
86. See Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 57 Haw. 10, 547 P.2d 1350 (1976)
(court allowed recovery of the difference between the policy's face value and the amount re-
ceived under tortfeasor's liability insurance); American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 116 N.H. 10, 357 A.2d 873 (1976) (tortfeasor "uninsured" where any one
injured person receives less than the statutory minimum coverage requirement from
tortfeasor's insurer).
87. See supra note 5; see also Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 45 Ohio St.2d 66, 341
N.E.2d 597 (1976) (tortfeasor with minimum liability coverage required by statute not "unin-
sured" even where multiple claims deplete insurance and certain victims receive no compensa-
tion); Detrick v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 261 Iowa 1246, 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968) (no recovery
even where victim's damages exceeded minimum statutory amounts of coverage carried by
tortfeasor); Brack v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 72, 382 A.2d 914 (1978) (no recovery
where tortfeasor's statutory minimum coverage did not completely compensate plaintiff).
88. See supra note 5.
89. Mundy, Underinsured Motorist Practice, PRACTICE IN UNINSURED MOTORIST
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surance, on the other hand, offered the difference between a
tortfeasor's limit of coverage and the amount of underinsured motor-
ist coverage available to the injured party.90 In either case, the provi-
sions extended the protection offered by uninsured motorist statutes
and assured greater compensation for innocent and injured accident
victims.
B. Pennsylvania
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted its first uninsured
motorist statute in 1963.91 The Uninsured Motorist Act was deficient
in at least one respect, however: as originally enacted, it did not de-
fine the term "uninsured motorist."9 As a result, interpretation of
this and other provisions was left to insurance companies, the Penn-
sylvania Insurance Commissioner,93 arbitration panels, and courts.
These sources provided a comprehensive characterization not only of
early uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in Pennsylvania,
but also of the subsequently enacted No-Fault Act9 and Financial
Responsibility Law. 98
1. Pennsylvania No-Fault: A Long Way From Fault-
less.-When Robert Burns spoke of "the best laid schemes o' mice
and men," 96 he was not referring to Pennsylvania's No-Fault Motor
CASES 67, 68 (1986) (available from Pennsylvania Bar Institute). Mundy further explains that
"[tihe classic definition of excess is where the underinsured vehicle is defined simply as one
whose coverage is less than the insured's damages and where there is no explicit limitation on
recovery in the statutory language." Id. Arizona, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Washington each provide for "'excess" insurance coverage. Id. at 67-68. The Pennsylvania In-
surance Department has already construed the new underinsurance provision as an "excess"
type of coverage. Pa. Ins. Guidelines for Filing Under Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law, § C-I (Aug. 10, 1984). See also infra note 156.
90. Id. at 68.
91. See supra note 3.
92. Schwartz and Craynock, Recognition of the Uninsured Motorist Claim, PRACTICE
IN UNINSURED MOTORIST CASES 11 (1986) (available from Pennsylvania Bar Institute).
93. The Insurance Commissioner's regulations on this subject are found at 31 PA. CODE
§ 63 (1979).
94. Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
1009.101-1009.701 (Purdon 1974 Supp.).
95. Supra note I.
96. The applicable stanza reads:
But Mousie, thou art no thy lane [not alone],
In proving foresight may be vain:
The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft a-gley [go oft awry],
An lea'e us nought but grief an' pain,
For promised joy.
Burns, Robert, "To a Mouse," The Norton Anthology of English Literature, p. 93, lines 37-43
(New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Co. 1962).
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Vehicle Insurance Act; but he could have been. The Act was pro-
posed and enacted with lofty intentions, but in practice the legisla-
tion fell far short of expectations. The stated purpose of the Act was
"to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a
Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for mo-
tor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims.
97
The optimism was short-lived, however, and after less than ten years
it was obvious that the law had serious defects. One legal authority
described the situation as it existed in early 1984:
The seventh highest auto insurance premiums in the nation are
paid by Pennsylvanians. The bodily injury (BI) premium, which
includes no-fault benefits and liability coverage, has increased at
a rate of 206 percent since the advent of no-fault. The overall
cost of auto insurance in this Commonwealth has risen at a rate
of 25 percent per year over the last nine, meaning that auto in-
surance has doubled in cost every four years. The end result of
these statistics is the alarming reality that 20 percent of all
Pennsylvania drivers are now uninsured despite the existence of
a supposed compulsory law."
In spite of its obvious defects, the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act
provided adequate protection for victims of uninsured motorists
through its assigned claims plan.99 Under the plan, persons who
could not obtain coverage through ordinary and usual means were
assigned to a participating insurer who provided insurance compara-
ble to that ordinarily available. 100 Originally, only basic loss bene-
fits101 were paid, but the state supreme court expanded the coverage
to include uninsured motorist benefits in Tubner v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Insurance Co.'02 The court reasoned that "[a]ny other in-
97. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1009.102(b) (Purdon 1974 Supp.).
98. Mundy, supra note 2, at I. James F. Mundy was President of the Pennsylvania Trial
Lawyers Association in 1984. One year earlier he had been called before the Pennsylvania
legislature for input on what would shortly be known as the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act.
99. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1009.108 (Purdon 1974 Supp.).
100. W. ARCHBOLD. J. QUINN. R. ANGINO, & L. SWARTZ, THE PENNSYLVANIA No-
FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT § 1:1 (D. Shrager ed. 1979) [hereinafter D.
SHRAGER].
101. Basic loss benefits are:
* . . benefits provided in accordance with [the No-Fault Act] for the net
loss sustained by a victim, subject to any applicable limitations, exclusions, de-
ductibles, waiting periods, disqualifications, or other terms and conditions pro-
vided or authorized in accordance with this act. Basic loss benefits do not include
benefits for damage to property. Nor do basic loss benefits include benefits for
net loss sustained by an operator or passenger of a motorcycle.
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1009.103 (Purdon 1974 Supp.).
102. 496 Pa. 215, 436 A.2d 621 (1981).
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terpretation . . . would frustrate the Legislature's intention . . . to
provide maximum feasible restoration to all accident victims in a
comprehensive, fair, and uniform manner."' 3 This decision was con-
sistent with Pennsylvania's liberal tradition of broadly construing au-
tomobile accident coverage provisions in favor of injured victims.10
2. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law: Victim-Oriented Protection.-By 1983, Pennsylvania's No-
Fault Act had become so costly and counterproductive that it was
repealed by the Senate, without a replacement, in order to pressure
legislators to draft an alternative. 10 5 No-Fault's successor - the Mo-
tor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1984106 - was hailed by
proponents as "an innovative auto insurance system designed to pro-
vide basic minimum protection for accident victims at lower cost
without restricting the right to sue.' 0 7 The uninsured motorist pro-
vision is a "hybrid coverage"' 08 which is essentially fault-based lia-
bility insurance containing elements of first party protection. 0 9
The Act defines financial responsibility as the ability to respond
to damages for liability in the use of motor vehicles in amounts
which satisfy personal injury and property damage of third par-
ties." 0 Coverage is required in amounts of $15,000 per person for
bodily injury (up to a maximum of $30,000 per accident) and $5,000
for property damage per accident."' The new law retains some no-
fault principles by requiring every insurance policy and self-insurer
to pay out-of-pocket losses on a first party basis. Policies and self-
insurers must provide coverage for medical benefits of $10,000, in-
103. 496 Pa. at 220, 436 A.2d at 623.
104. See. e.g., Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967) (ex-
panding definition of "uninsured motorist" to include motor vehicle operator whose statutorily
adequate insurance policy was rendered ineffective by the insurer's insolvency); Harleysville
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968) (where loss exceeds limits of
one policy, insured may proceed under other available policies up to their limits or to amount
of actual loss).
105, Mundy, supra note 2, at I. Further discussion of the specific provisions of the
Pennsylvania No-Fault Act, as well as the reasons for its failure, is beyond the scope of this
article. For a detailed analysis of the statute, see D. SHRAGER, supra note 100.
106. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, §§ 1701-1798 (Purdon 1984).
107. Ronca, supra note 1, at 1.
108. Schwartz & Craynock, supra note 92, at II.
109. Id.
110. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Purdon 1984).
Ill. Id. Financial responsibility can be demonstrated by the purchase of a liability in-
surance policy, through self-insurance, id. at § 1787, or by filing evidence of financial responsi-
bility with the Department of Transportation and Insurance. Id. at § 1782. Self-certifiers need
not provide uninsured motorist benefits. McCormick, Basis of Uninsured Motorist Actions,
PRACTICE IN UNINSURED MOTORIST CASES (1986) (available from Pennsylvania Bar
Institute).
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come loss benefits up to a monthly maximum of $1,000 (with a
$5,000 maximum benefit),"' and a $1,500 funeral benefit."13 In ad-
dition, the law requires insurers to provide higher limits of coverage
at the policyholder's request.""
The Financial Responsibility Act specifies priorities of coverage
for the recovery of first party benefits:
(a) A named insured recovers from his or her own policy.
(b) A person who is not a named insured but is a relative resid-
ing in the household of a named insured, recovers from the
named insured's policy.
(c) The occupant of a vehicle who is neither a named insured
under (a) or an insured under (b), recovers from the insurance
on the vehicle.
(d) A pedestrian who is not a named insured under (a) or an
insured under (b), recovers from any motor vehicle involved in
the accident, except a properly parked vehicle not involved in
the accident.115
If two or more policies apply within the highest priority, the com-
pany against whom the first claim is brought pays benefits as if en-
tirely responsible."' That insurer is then entitled to pro-rata contri-
bution from the other applicable insurers within the priority level." 7
The total benefits received by an accident victim may not exceed the
112. The income loss benefit "may be expressly waived by the named insured provided
the named insured has no expectation of actual income loss due to age, disability or lack of
employment history." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1711 (Purdon 1984).
113. Id. An insured who is eligible to receive benefits under section 1711 is precluded
from pleading, introducing into evidence, or recovering the amount of benefits actually paid or
potentially payable under the provision. Id. at § 1722.
114. Section 1715 requires insurers to make available the following higher limits of first
party benefits:
(I) For medical benefits, up to at least $100,000.
(2) For income loss benefits, up to at least $2,500 per month up to a maxi-
mum benefit of at least $50,000.
(3) For accidental death benefits, up to at least $25,000.
(4) For funeral benefits, $2,500.
(5) For combination of benefits enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (4)
and subject to a limit on the accidental death benefit of up to $25,000 and a
limit on the funeral benefit of $2,500, up to at least $277,500 of benefits in the
aggregate or benefits payable up to three years from the date of the accident,
whichever occurs first.
Id. at § 1715. These higher limits are not precluded from pleading in an action for damages
against a tortfeasor. Id. at § 1722.
115. Ronca, supra note I, at 10.
116. 3 1. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE: NO-FAULT INSURANCE, UNIN-
SURED MOTORISTS COMPULSORY COVERAGE, Appendix at PA-4 (1985) [hereinafter 3 1.
SCHERMER].
117. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1713(b) (Purdon 1984).
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coverage provided by the policy with the highest dollar level of prior-
ity. 1 8 Duplicate benefits and stacking" 9 are also prohibited with re-
spect to first party coverage. 20
The new Pennsylvania law requires every automobile insurance
policy issued after October 1, 1984, to provide uninsured and under-
insured motorist coverage in amounts equal to the policyholder's lim-
its of liability. 2 ' As an alternative, an insured may elect higher or
lower limits of coverage.2 2 These provisions further the policy of vic-
tim-oriented protection by shifting coverage determination from the
negligent motorist to the innocent claimant, thus eliminating a com-
mon inequity of the former no-fault law.'
The underinsured compensation plan prescribed by the Finan-
cial Responsibility Law affects the rights of victims of financially
irresponsible motorists in an even more profound way than through
the self-determination of coverage limits. Although underinsured
motorist protection has been voluntarily offered by carriers in the
past, courts consistently refused to afford such provisions the broad
latitude normally given to UM endorsements. 24 Jurists attributed
this distinction to the absence of a legislative mandate for underin-
sured motorist coverage, often with reasoning similar to the
following:
The legislature has not by statute established a policy which
compels the writing of underinsured motorist coverage. An in-
surance company is wholly free to issue a policy of automobile
liability insurance which contains no protection whatsoever
against underinsured motorists. Although companies, for an ad-
ditional premium, may undertake to write such coverage, the
underinsured motorist feature is purely optional. An insured
may purchase such coverage or he may decline to pay the pre-
mium charged therefor and accept a policy which contains no
such coverage. When underinsured motorist coverage is in-
cluded, the terms and limitations thereof are not controlled by
118. 3 1. SCHERMER, supra note 116.
119. The concept of stacking "involves the application of one or more insurance policies
covering a particular insured so as to provide multiple amounts of coverage." I NO-FAULT
AND UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 11.60(2)(c) (B. Denkensohn ed. 1986).
120. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1717, 1719 (Purdon 1984).
121. Id. at §§ 1731, 1736.
122. Id. at § 1734.
123. In addition, the Assigned Claims Plan now specifically provides for the recovery of
uninsured motorist benefits. Id. at § 1754. See also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying
text.
124. Kardos, Stacking and Statute of Limitations, PRACTICE IN UNINSURED MOTORIST
CASES 52 (1986) (available from Pennsylvania Bar Institute).
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statute or by public policy but by the agreement reached by the
parties. That agreement, as expressed in the policy of insurance,
may place limitations on underinsured motorist coverage, sub-
ject only to the requirements that the limitations be clearly
worded and conspicuously displayed."'
The Financial Responsibility Act might well bring underinsured mo-
torist provisions within the realm of liberal judicial construction af-
forded their sister UM endorsements and force courts to interpret
such plans with the public policy of victim protection in mind.
III. Abuse of the Insurance Relationship: Insurers Wield the Up-
per Hand
Insurance is big business. As of 1979, protection against loss
was a 150 billion dollar industry, consuming a hefty one-eighth of
the total disposal income of all Americans.12a This vast size, coupled
with the special nature of the insurance relationship, 12 7 creates an
environment which is extremely susceptible to abuse by parties who
"wield the upper hand."
A. The Special Character of the Insurance Relationship.
As the insurance industry developed into a large scale enter-
prise, the nature of the contractual relationship changed dramati-
cally. As one author explained, "[t]he individuality of the parties
which so frequently gave color to the old type of contract has disap-
peared. The stereotyped contract of today reflects the impersonality
of the market. 1' 28 Out of necessity, insurance companies were forced
to market standardized contracts to keep up with citizen demand,
and insureds, who had no choice but to accept such policies, were
disadvantaged in the process.
Courts began to recognize the standard insurance policy as a
contract of adhesion, marked by an insurer's overwhelmingly su-perior economic power, bargaining position, and semantic sophistica-
125. Votedian v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 13, 18,
478 A.2d 1324, 1327 (1984) (pre-October 1, 1984, decision refusing to void provision of auto-
mobile policy which prohibited stacking of underinsurance coverage). The court in Votedian
did take notice of the mandatory underinsured motorist coverage required by the Financial
Responsibility Act, which was to become effective several months after the decision. Id. at
1329 n.3.
126. Los Angeles Times, July 15, 1979, § IV, at I, col. 5.
127. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
128. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943).
129. See supra note 8.
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tion. 130 Professor Friedrich Kessler described the uneven relationship
between the insurance "seller" and the policy "buyer":
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with
strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods
or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for
better terms, either because the author of the standard contract
has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors
use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjec-
tion more or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger
party, terms whose consequences are understood only in a vague
way, if at all. Thus, standardized contracts are often contracts of
adhesion.13'
Jurists who recognized the dangerous potential for abuse which
stemmed from the insurance relationship also realized that the tradi-
tional laissez-faire treatment of private contracts espoused by a ma-
jority of the courts"12 would not afford insured parties the protection
they needed and deserved. The "caveat emptor" and "freedom of
contract" reasoning typical of early opinions was gradually replaced
by a more buyer-oriented approach. Courts began to resolve ambigu-
ities in favor of the non-drafting party 3 and to consider an insured's
reasonable expectations of coverage in their decisionmaking.3'
The risk underwriting industry is unique in another respect - it
has a profound effect on the public interest. Insurers hold themselves
out to the buying public as a source of protection for their custom-
ers. Advertising campaigns which depict policyholders "in good
hands" or portray companies as being "on your side" create images
in the minds of potential insureds that insurance carriers have their
best interests at heart. The buying public, which generally enters
into insurance contracts for peace of mind and security, carries a
reasonably high expectation of insurer performance into the relation-
ship. Courts in many jurisdictions take this consideration into mind
in the decisionmaking process and will often look beyond the form of
a contract for the protection of an insured's interests.'35 In this way,
the courts can equalize the bargaining positions of the parties to
130. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 1.04.
131. Kessler, supra note 128, at 632.
132. See, e.g., Urian v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 144, 165 A. 21 (1933) (judicial
system provides for an interpretation of contracts made by the litigants, not to the making of
contracts for them).
133. See, e.g., Karl v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 182, 381 A.2d 67 (1977).
134. See, e.g., Daburlos v. Commercial Ins. Co., 521 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying
Pa. law).
135. W. SHERNOFF, supra note 10, at § 1.04.
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some degree.
B. The Potential for Abuse in Pennsylvania: Insurer Bad Faith
Refusal to Waive Subrogation Rights in Underinsured Motorist
Cases
The special character of the insurance relationship has created a
potential for abuse in a specific class of Pennsylvania underinsured
motorist cases. The situation is precipitated by a carrier's bad faith
refusal to consent to a policy limits settlement in an effort to "trap"
the insured into violating a "no-consent-to-settlement clause." An in-
surer could then invoke the unauthorized settlement as a defense to
payment of underinsured motorist benefits. The Financial Responsi-
bility Act does not provide a "safe" method to terminate a third
party claim under these circumstances.
Pennsylvania insurers have a statutory right to subrogation3 0
pursuant to the state's Uninsured Motorist Statute, which provides
in pertinent part that:
In the event of payment to any person under the [uninsured
motorist] coverage required by this section, the insurer making
such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise
of any rights or recovery of such person against any person or
organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for which
such payment is made .... 137
The Financial Responsibility Act does not affect an uninsurer or un-
derinsurer's right to subrogate against a third party.138 Courts have
strictly construed the UM statute to permit a carrier to assert subro-
gation rights not only against the under/uninsured tortfeasor, but
also against any person or entity responsible for causing the injuries,
regardless of their insurance status. 3 9 However, the carrier cannot
maintain a claim for reimbursement until an insured has been fully
compensated for his or her injuries.14 0
The Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner has drafted model
136. Subrogation is defined as "[tlhe substitution of one person in the place of another
with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right as that he who is substituted succeeds to the
rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
137. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000(d) (Purdon 1971).
138. Mundy, supra note 89, at 72.
139. See Walls v. City of Pittsburgh, 292 Pa. Super. 18, 436 A.2d 698 (1981); Cotton v.
INA, 344 Pa. Super. 602, 497 A.2d 254 (1985).
140. Walls, 292 Pa. Super. at 23, 436 A.2d at 701.
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language for insurance policies which is consistent with the UM stat-
ute. The "trust agreement" ' alerts the policyholder to the insurer's
claim and puts him or her on notice that impairment of the carrier's
rights may be a defense to payment of benefits. Like the UM stat-
ute, trust agreements are strictly construed against the drafter insur-
ance company."" Any ambiguity resolved in favor of the insured
may also prejudice the insurer's subrogation lien."'
The potential for problems arises when a company includes a
"no-consent-to-settlement" clause in addition to its trust agreement.
The standard provision provides that "coverage is inapplicable to
bodily injury with respect to which any person entitled to payment
under this coverage shall, without written consent of the company,
make any settlement with any person or organization who may be
legally liable therefor.""' In effect, an unauthorized settlement
which impairs an insurer's subrogation rights"" may serve as a de-
fense and bar a policyholder's access to benefits." 6 Such an exclu-
sionary clause can be waived, or the carrier can be prevented from
141. The model language provides:
TRUST AGREEMENT. In the event of payment to any person under this
(uninsured motorist) endorsement:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to
the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the ex-
ercise of any rights of recovery of such person against any person or or-
ganization legally responsible for the bodily injury because of which such
payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all
rights of recovery which he shall have against such other person or organ-
ization because of the damages which are the subject of claim made
under this endorsement;
(c) such persons shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do
nothing after loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such persons shall take,
through any representative designated by the company, such action as
may be necessary or appropriate to recover such payment as damages
from such other person or organization, such action to be taken in the
name of such person; in the event of a recovery, the company shall be
reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees
incurred by it in connection therewith;
(e) such persons shall execute and deliver to the company such in-
struments and papers as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obli-
gations of such person and company established by this provision.
31 PA. CODE § 63.2, para. 9 (1986) (emphasis added).
142. See Shamey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Pa. Super. 215, 331 A.2d 498
(1979).
143. Id.
144. 3 I. SCHERMER, supra note 116, at § 35.09.
145. Cf. 31 PA. CODE § 63.2, para. 9 (1986) (claimant should do nothing after loss to
prejudice insurer's subrogation rights).
146. See. e.g., Lopez v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 412 So.2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gray, 360 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
reliance thereon, if it fails to advise its client during settlement nego-
tiations that the defense is available. 1 7 Otherwise, an insured's re-
lease of a third party may prejudice the underinsured claim and pre-
clude his or her rights to benefits thereunder. "8
IV. Potential Solutions from Other Jurisdictions
Courts in a number of jurisdictions have dealt with the problem
of an insurer's refusal to "waive" its subrogation rights by failure to
consent to a third-party settlement offer. In Minnesota, the courts
provide an insurer with a means to protect its own subrogation rights
while still allowing a policyholder the option of settlement." 9 Under
the Florida Approach,1 50 an insurer's bad faith settlement rejection
may be subjected to tort liability for punitive damages. In addition,
the carrier may lose its defense to the underinsured motorist claim.
Finally, legal scholars have suggested a number of pretrial measures
which may alleviate such a situation and prevent the need for fur-
ther litigation. 15 1
A. The Minnesota Approach
The Supreme Court of Minnesota entertained the issue of an
insurer's bad faith refusal to settle in Schmidt v. Clothier.'52 The
case arose from an automobile accident in which Lloyd Schmidt was
struck and killed by a truck driven by defendant Clothier.153 Cloth-
ier's employer carried a $100,000 liability policy with St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), which offered a policy-
limits settlement to Schmidt's widow in exchange for a full release.
Since damages totalled more than $265,000, her $100,000 underin-
surance coverage with Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco) was trig-
gered and she informed Safeco that she intended to accept St. Paul's
settlement offer. Safeco relied on a cooperation clause in the policy,
as well as on its claimed subrogation interest, and refused to acqui-
esce in the offer. Schmidt requested that her claim be submitted to
arbitration, but Safeco refused. Safeco eventually tendered a
147. See Rutherford v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 843 (Tenn.
1980).
148. See Roberts v. Fireman Ins. Co. of Newark, 376 Pa. 99, 101 A.2d 747 (1954);
Bradford v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 213 Pa. Super. 8, 245 A.2d 748 (1968).
149. See infra notes 152-161.
150. See infra notes 162-177.
151. See infra notes 178-182.
152. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
153. A consolidated case with similar facts was decided at the same time as Schmidt.
Id. at 259.
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$100,000 check to her with the requirement that she agree to hold in
trust for Safeco any recovery she obtained from any source and to
fully release Safeco from any claim she might make.
154
Schmidt petitioned the Dakota County District Court for an or-
der authorizing her to accept both the settlement check from St.
Paul and the underinsurance check from Safeco. The district court
provided an unusual remedy, authorizing her to accept the settle-
ment check and to execute a full release of the defendants. The court
then stayed the order for ten days, giving Safeco the chance to offer
Schmidt a check of equal value and thus protect any subrogation
rights it had against the defendants. Upon such a tender, Schmidt
was required to refuse St. Paul's settlement offer. Finally, the court
ordered Safeco either to pay $100,000 in underinsured motorist ben-
efits or to submit the claim to arbitration. When Safeco refused to
comply with either alternative, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
granted discretionary review.155
The supreme court first considered the public policy of Minne-
sota, which provides that "injured persons should not, by virtue of
having purchased underinsurance, be placed in a financial position
inferior to that which they would have held had the tortfeasor been
fully uninsured." 5 Based on this notion, the court held that an in-
sured's settlement and subsequent release of a tortfeasor does not
preclude his or her recovery of underinsured motorist benefits. 157 The
court advised that an insurer's prompt payment of benefits, notice-
154. Id.
155. Id. The court disposed of two preliminary issues before resolving the question of the
insurer's settlement refusal. First, the court held that exhaustion clauses, which require policy-
limits settlements with a tortfeasor for the payment of underinsured motorist benefits, are void
as against the policies of the state's no-fault act, i.e., to ease the burden of litigation and to
provide for the prompt settlement of claims. Id. at 260-61. Second, the court adopted an "ex-
cess" view of underinsurance, stating:
We conclude that the insured cannot obtain a below-limit settlement from
the tortfeasor and then recoup the "gap" from the underinsurance carrier. Prac-
tically, the insured would have no incentive to obtain the best settlement if he or
she is assured of recovering the "gap" from the underinsurer. Use of underin-
surance benefits in this way runs counter to the agreement of the parties. It
would also place the underinsurer at an unfair disadvantage in which it had no
control over the insured's right to settle but yet had to pay the difference be-
tween the settlement and the liability limits. It might also lessen the incentive of
the liability carrier to make its best offer to the claimant. We hold that the
underinsurer is liable only for the amount of damages suffered by the insured in
excess of the liability limits of the defendant. This holding permits the underin-
surance claim to be processed immediately, without regard to any eventual set-
tlement, for the underinsurer's liability depends not on the settlement but rather
on the readily ascertainable liability limit of the defendant.
Id. at 261. See also supra note 89.
156. Id. at 262. See also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
157. 338 N.W.2d at 262.
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ably absent in the case before it, will not "defeat the subrogation
right but rather will be viewed as a waiver of the rule against split-
ting the cause of action."158
The Minnesota Supreme Court next balanced the interests of
the underinsurer, which has compensated its policyholder, and the
tortfeasor, who has not accounted for the injuries caused by his or
her negligence. Reiterating the fact that an insurer is entitled to sub-
rogation rights only after the injured party has been fully compen-
sated, and then only if it has paid underinsurance benefits prior to
the tortfeasor's release, the supreme court cited the district court's
remedy with approval:
Under the procedure [set forth by the district court], the
underinsurer was given notice of the tentative settlement agree-
ment and a period of time in which to assess the case. In that
time, it could evaluate relevant factors, such as the amount of
the settlement, the amount of liability insurance remaining, if
any, the amount of assets held by the tortfeasor and the likeli-
hood of their recovery via subrogation, the total amount of the
insured's damages, and the expenses and risks of litigating the
insured's cause of action. If the underinsurer were to determine
after assessment that recovery of underinsurance benefits it paid
was unlikely (e.g., where the liability limits are exhausted or
nearly so and the tortfeasor is judgment-proof), it could simply
let the "grace period" expire and permit the settlement and re-
lease. It must, of course, thereafter, process the underinsurance
claim but would not be able to recover those payments through
subrogation.
If, on the other hand, damages were substantially more than the
liability limits and the tortfeasor had substantial assets, the un-
derinsurer could substitute its payment to the insured in an
amount equal to the tentative settlement. In this situation, the
underinsurer's payment would protect its subrogation rights to
the extent of the payment, and the insured would receive the
amount of the settlement offer in cash. The underinsurer would
then have to arbitrate the underinsured claim and could, there-
after, attempt to negotiate a better settlement or could proceed
to trial in the insured's name.
1 59
The court slightly modified this policy by providing a 30-day period
in which an underinsurer can assess the claim for benefits and the
158. Id.
159. 338 N.W.2d at 263 (citations omitted).
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financial character of the tortfeasor. 160
In applying this holding to the facts of the Schmidt case, the
court found that Safeco was precluded from subrogation and was
required either to pay $100,000 in benefits or to submit the claim to
arbitration. Further, it allowed the claimant to release the defend-
ants and to accept their settlement check for $100,000.16 The court
thus protected the rights of both the victim and the underinsurance
carrier.
B. The Florida Approach
The Florida courts have taken a very different approach to an
insurer's bad faith failure to waive subrogation rights in underin-
sured motorist cases. Unlike Minnesota's plan, which is designed to
prevent such a situation from occurring, the Florida courts look to
the facts of each case in retrospect and determine, first, if an in-
surer's subrogation rights have been "effectively" prejudiced, and
second, if the carrier is liable for tortious breach of contract and
punitive damages.
In Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company v. Earnest,162 an
insurer attempted to invoke the defense of prejudice to its subroga-
tion rights to preclude its payment of UM benefits. Its insured,
Linda Earnest, had executed an unauthorized release and settlement
with the tortfeasor, an "impoverished maid [who] was completely
judgment-proof.""' The court looked beyond the actual violation of
the policy provision to the more substantial issue: whether the viola-
tion actually prejudiced the insurer. In view of the tortfeasor's ex-
tremely poor financial situation, 64 the court found that the release
was "demonstrably immaterial to any otherwise-existing ability of
Southeastern to recover.' 65 The court, which practically chastised
Southeastern for bringing a frivolous claim, stated:
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 395 So.2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
163. Id. at 230.
164. It was stipulated that the tortfeasor, Mrs. Bradwell, was judgment-proof:
Ms. Earnest's case had a value of more than $30,000, the total of the
tortfeasor's $10,000 liability coverage and Southeastern's $20,000 UM protec-
tion. If the settlement with Mrs. Bradwell had not been effected, therefore,
Southeastern's subrogated $20,000 claim against her would have been junior to
Ms. Earnest's claim for the amount over $30,000 for which she would not have
been compensated. This renders it all the more obvious that the potential
$20,000 judgment against Mrs. Bradwell would have been entirely worthless.
Id. at 230-31.
165. Id. at 231.
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[Southeastern] argues that depriving a carrier of any judg-
ment, however uncollectible, against any defendant, however in-
solvent, is necessarily prejudicial . . . . This contention is so ut-
terly contrary to common business sense and commercial reality
as to be unworthy of any comment beyond summary rejection.
A judgment against [the tortfeasor] would not have been worth
the paper it was printed on and no reasonable person would have
expended the costs, let alone the attorney's fees, it would have
required to get it. When Southeastern lost the opportunity to
secure the judgment, it lost nothing. Under our law, a technical
and illusory "loss" of this kind cannot result in the forfeiture of
insurance coverage." 6"
In Tucker v. Seward,167 the Florida District Court of Appeals
followed the Earnest rationale and found that the insured's unautho-
rized release of a 99-year old nursing home resident with no future
earning capacity and no assets168 was not prejudicial to the insurer's
subrogation rights.169
A second line of Florida appellate decisions recognizes the po-
tential for unfair dealing by insurers and makes it clear that when
an insurer unreasonably refuses to consent to a third-party claim, the
carrier may be held liable in tort for damages .proximately caused by
its actions because of the violation of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing. In Evans v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Company,170
Michael Evans was severely injured in an automobile accident with
Margaret Glenn. Glenn, who carried a $10,000 bodily injury liability
policy with Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO),
was undisputedly at fault. Her insurance was insufficient to cover
Evans' injuries, however. Evans was insured by the Florida Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) and carried a
$25,000 under/uninsured motorist policy. The policy provided that
Evans obtain the written consent of Farm Bureau to any settlement
offer.
Glenn and GEICO offered Evans a policy-limits settlement and
Evans requested Farm Bureau's approval. The insurer failed to re-
spond to Evan's demand and intimated that his claim would not be
settled for several years. Evans contended that Farm Bureau's ac-
tions were designed to force him into an unauthorized settlement by
166. Id.
167. 400 So.2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
168. Id. at 506.
169. Id.
170. 384 So.2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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which he would lose his right to receive UM benefits. In his com-
plaint, Evans alleged the "Farm Bureau did not exercise reasonable
diligence or ordinary care toward appellant in that it maliciously at-
tempted to manipulate [him] to perfect a settlement with Glenn and
GEICO without its consent so that [he] would forfeit his right to
recover under his uninsured motorist coverage with [Farm Bu-
reau]."b 17 Evans brought suit alleging both tort and contract causes
of action.
172
In its reasoning, the court relied heavily on an insurer's duty to
act reasonably toward its policyholder.1 73 It distinguished the case of
a third-party settlement from a settlement with one's own insurer for
UM benefits. In the latter, no duty is necessary because "the inter-
ests of the insurer are wholly adverse to those of its insured as to
every facet of [the UM] claim. 17 4 In determining whether Farm Bu-
reau had exercised reasonable diligence or ordinary care toward Ev-
ans, or whether it had maliciously tried to manipulate him, the court
concluded that Farm Bureau had not made a reasonable effort to
ascertain whether the tortfeasor was judgment-proof. Further, it
found that the insurer could have joined Evans in his suit in order to
protect its subrogation rights if it was truly interested in securing its
own interests."7 " The court quoted a Missouri Court of Appeals deci-
sion' 7 which found a similar consent clause valid, cautioning:
We hasten to add the caveat that the foregoing should not
be misinterpreted as an expression of opinion that the settlement
prohibition accords to an insurer the untrammeled, uninhibited
and unlimited right to reject or ignore an insured's request for
written consent to a proposed settlement with a 'person or or-
ganization who may be legally liable' for bodily injury to the
insured. On the contrary, we think that the propriety of the in-
surer's action in response to any such request should be, when
appropriately and properly put in issue, subject to judicial scru-
tiny and measurement under the rule of reason, i.e., subject to
determination as to whether the insured's conduct with respect
to any such request is, under all of the facts and circumstances
of that particular situation, arbitrary or unreasonable.
17
1
The court reversed the entry of summary judgments by the circuit
171. Id. at 961.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 962.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Kesling v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App. 1961).
177. Id. at 251.
1009
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
court and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
Farm Bureau had acted reasonably towards Evans and was therefore
liable for tortious breach of contract and punitive damages. In this
way, the court extended the scope of an insurer's duty of fair dealing
with its policyholders.
C. Pretrial Tactics
Short of judicial or legislative measures such as the ones
adopted by Minnesota and Florida, states which do not have a
"safe" method for terminating third party claims can utilize a num-
ber of pretrial tactics to reduce the possibility that an insurer will
refuse to consent to a policy limits settlement. One legal scholar sug-
gests a number of steps to take when pursuing an underinsured mo-
torist claim:' 8
A claimant should notify the underinsurance carrier of the
potential claim as early as possible, keeping the insurer apprised
of the progress of the action with frequent correspondence, in-
cluding relevant medical records. Once the claimant realizes
that the tortfeasor's third party liability coverage will be inade-
quate to fully compensate him for damages, the claimant should
request permission to settle. In cases in which it appears that a
tortfeasor might be judgment-proof or have insignificant assets,
a claimant would be well-advised to depose the defendant.
Through this confrontation, the claimant should attempt to show
that a subrogation claim by the insurer, "while theoretically
meritorious, would in actuality be non-productive.""7 9
The insured motorist should attempt to persuade the liability carrier
to accept a partial release, which would only discharge the carrier,
not the tortfeasor. Finally, a claimant should pursue arbitration of
the underinsured motorist claim by asking either for full damages or
for the combined third party and liability limit as a ceiling.1 80
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has suggested similar mea-
sures in the absence of a state-sanctioned method of safely terminat-
ing uninsured motorist claims against a third party. In Porter v.
MFA Mutual Insurance Company, 81 the court upheld an insurer's
defense of prejudice to its subrogation rights and affirmed the claim-
ant's preclusion from benefits under his UM policy. However, the
178. Mundy, supra note 89, at 72.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 643 P.2d 302 (Okla. 1982).
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court advised that the insured could have taken steps to prevent such
a holding: "What [the claimant] should have done was make settle-
ment with [the tortfeasor's] carrier by means of a partial release,
conditioned on the reservation of whatever rights and interests [the
uninsured motorist carrier] might have thereafter against the tort-
feasor."'' 2 Incorporation of these steps in a claim for underinsured
or uninsured motorist benefits may alleviate the problem of having
the claimant's carrier refuse to consent to an eventual third party
settlement offer.
V. Suggested Policy for Pennsylvania Underinsured Motorist
Claims
The Minnesota, Florida, and pretrial plans'8 3 each address es-
sentially the same problem - an underinsurer's bad faith failure to
waive its subrogation rights to a victim's third party recovery. Yet
each relates to a specific period on the timetable of an underinsured
motorist claim. For this reason, the plans and their respective advan-
tages and disadvantages cannot be compared as "better" or "worse,"
but merely as expressions of a jurisdiction's particular public policy
respecting victim compensation.
The Minnesota plan adopted in Schmidt v. Clothier'84 is pri-
marily a preventive measure designed to avoid the necessity of im-
posing liability on an insurer for its failure to act reasonably and
with the claimant's best interests in mind. The Florida approach, il-
lustrated by Earnest,'8  Tucker,'8 6 and Evans,187 is essentially the
action Schmidt seeks to avoid. In the absence of a specific legislative
or judicial directive respecting the termination of third party claims,
the measure provides an effective means of punishing dilatory insur-
ance carriers for their failure to acquiesce in a tortfeasor's settlement
offer. The scheme also looks beyond the mere form of an insurer's
defense to an underinsured motorist claim and instead goes to the
substance of the denial and whether the carrier's rights have really
been prejudiced. Finally, the pretrial measures sanctioned by courts
in Oklahoma 8 8 and legal scholars in Pennsylvania' 89 speak to states
182. Id. at 305.
183. See supra notes 150-182 and accompanying text.
184. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
185. 395 So.2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
186. 400 So.2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
187. 384 So.2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
188. 643 P.2d 302 (Okla. 1982).
189. See supra note 89.
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which do not provide a "safe" method of terminating third party
claims.
In assessing the merits of each of the approaches to risk-free
third party settlement, no issue is more fundamental to an effective
and cost-efficient auto reparations system than a particular plan's ef-
fect on the current insurance environment and the alleged litigation
explosion. 1"0 The Minnesota plan, which attempts to prevent abuses
through a system designed to protect the rights of both the accident
victim and its insurer, effectively considers the current public policy
of avoiding multiple litigations whenever possible. The plan's
strength lies in the theory of compromise it affords to the first party
insurer and its insured, who are normally adversarial because of the
nature of the coverage. By allowing a carrier to protect its subroga-
tion rights, while at the same time providing a fast and efficient
means of compensation for the accident victim, the Minnesota
scheme successfully considers both judicial economy and the rights
of the claimant and his or her insurer.
The Florida plan, on the other hand, may not effectuate efficient
use of the judicial system as well as the settlement scheme adopted
in Minnesota. By its very nature, the program adds to the current
burden of litigation on the courts by sanctioning an additional cause
of action for an insurer's bad faith refusal to waive its subrogation
rights. The possibility of a suit for tortious breach of contract may
eventually prove to be a deterrent to such behavior, however, and
might in reality effect a decrease in the long-run aggregate number
of lawsuits.
For Pennsylvania, evaluation of the newly-enacted underinsured
motorist statute and its effect on the problem of the financially irre-
sponsible motorist must wait several years until its progress can be
accurately determined. In the meantime, courts must interpret the
law to best effectuate its underlying purpose - full compensation of
the automobile accident victim. By providing a safe method of termi-
nating third party claims, courts could alleviate the problem of an
insurer's bad faith settlement refusal and provide for effective plain-
tiff reparation. The Minnesota plan best achieves this end by provid-
190. A continuing debate rages as to whether an insurance crisis does, in fact, exist.
Robert Hunter, President of the National Insurance Consumer Organization, claims that the
insurance crisis is "a manufactured crisis intended to bloat profits and reduce victims' rights."
He contends that the insurance industry, given its current price increase, will experience
skyrocketing profits. INSURANCE COMMITTEE OF PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
supra note 19, at 11-6. Henry G. Hager, President of the Insurance Federation of Pennsylva-
nia, disagrees: "Not only are these strong accusations, but they are false and misleading." Id.
at 11-21.
SUBROGATION RIGHTS
ing a compromise between protection of insurers' subrogation rights
and compensation of the victims of financially irresponsible
motorists.
VI. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
is a victim-oriented accident reparation system designed to provide
security and compensation to the Commonwealth's driving public.
The system fails to provide a specific method for safely terminating
third party claims without precluding an insured from his underin-
sured motorist benefits. This omission, coupled with the special na-
ture of the insurance relationship, creates a potential for abuse in
Pennsylvania underinsured motorist cases. The Minnesota plan,
which provides measures by which the situation can be alleviated,
best considers the public policy of judicial economy and the rights of
both insurers and their insureds. By providing an option to insurance
carriers early in the claims timetable, the scheme eliminates the ne-
cessity for further litigation and best embodies the black letter and
spirit of the law. Adoption of a Minnesota-type plan in Pennsylvania
would eliminate the need for a cause of action such as that devel-
oped in the Florida courts and would provide both insurers and in-
sureds with the means to protect their interests. Thus, the Schmidt
plan clearly embodies the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth
a pound of cure. 19'
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191. For further information on Pennsylvania's financial responsibility law, see J.
RONCA. L. SLOANE & J. MUNDY, PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW (1986).

